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Abstract
Current ICT infrastructures are characterized by increasing requirements of reliability, security, perfor-
mance, availability, adaptability. A relevant issue is represented by the scalability of the system with
respect to the increasing number of users and applications, thus requiring a careful dimensioning of re-
sources. Furthermore, new security issues to be faced arise from exposing applications and data to the
Internet, thus requiring an attentive analysis of potential threats and the identiﬁcation of stronger secu-
rity mechanisms to be implemented, which may produce a negative impact on system performance and
scalability properties. The paper presents a model-based evaluation of scalability and security tradeoﬀs of
a multi-service web-based platform, by evaluating how the introduction of security mechanisms may lead
to a degradation of performance properties. The evaluation focuses on the OPENNESS platform, a web-
based platform providing diﬀerent kind of services, to diﬀerent categories of users. The evaluation aims at
identifying the bottlenecks of the system, under diﬀerent conﬁgurations, and assess the impact of security
countermeasures which were identiﬁed by a thorough threat analysis activity previously carried out on the
target system. The modeling activity has been carried out using the Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs)
formalism, making full use of its characteristics of modularity and reusability. The analysis model is realized
through the composition of a set of predeﬁned template models, which facilitates the construction of the
overall system model, and the evaluation of diﬀerent conﬁguration by composing them in diﬀerent ways.
Keywords: Performance evaluation, scalability, web-services, security evaluation, security tradeoﬀs.
1 Introduction
The increased mobility of devices, pervasive connectivity, and multiple devices per
user, produced a shift towards a “thin client” approach, where a large part of the
required storage and computational power is demanded to servers [3]. The recent
cloud computing paradigm extends this approach with an additional layer of ab-
straction, which separates physical resources (i.e., hardware) from logical resources
(e.g., applications, storage, computational power) which are provided to users.
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In the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) paradigm, software applications are hosted
on a central server, and provided to users on-demand. This is often accomplished
by means of web-based interfaces, so that clients do not need any other application
than a web browser. Social networks and online storage facilities are prominent
examples of this paradigm. Due to its advantages in terms of resources, costs,
and convenience, this kind of paradigm is often used also within organizations, to
provide services to employees or internal users.
However, this approach also introduces several challenges. One of the main prob-
lems consists in the scalability of the system with respect to an increasing population
of users and applications, so that resources need to be carefully dimensioned. An-
other challenge consists in the additional security threats originating from exposing
applications and data to the Internet, thus requiring stronger security mechanisms
to be implemented within the system. Security and performance are often in con-
trast with each other [17]: mechanisms to improve the security of the system often
prescribe constraints on resource usage, or require additional computations to be
performed in order to guarantee that security policies deﬁned at design time are
actually applied at runtime. Moreover, a large part of security mechanisms relies
on cryptography algorithms, which are typically resource-intensive. Therefore, the
addition of security mechanisms can produce a negative impact on system perfor-
mance, which needs to be carefully quantiﬁed and evaluated.
In this paper we adopt a stochastic modeling approach in order to evaluate the
scalability of a multi-service web-based platform, and the impact of introducing
security mechanisms. The evaluation focuses on the OPENNESS platform, a web-
based platform providing diﬀerent services, to diﬀerent categories of users. The
evaluation aims at identifying the bottlenecks of the system, under diﬀerent conﬁg-
urations, and assess the impact of security countermeasures.
The model is constructed using the Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) for-
malism [16], which can be considered an extension of the well-known Stochastic
Petri Nets (SPNs) [5] formalism. The key characteristic of our approach is in the
modularity and reusability of the model: the analysis model is deﬁned as a compo-
sition of a small set of “template” SAN models, which are then composed to form
the overall system model. By composing them in diﬀerent ways, the same templates
can be used to evaluate diﬀerent system conﬁgurations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The OPENNESS framework is
described in Section 2, while related work are discussed in Section 3. The stochas-
tic model is described in Section 4, while evaluations and results are described in
Section 5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 The OPENNESS Platform
The OPENNESS (OPEN Networked Enterprise Social Software suite) platform is
the framework conceived within the research project VINCENTE [18], which aims
at deﬁning, realizing, and experimenting a technological platform for sustainable
entrepreneurship. It optimizes the resources, enhances the sharing of knowledge,
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Fig. 1. Logical architecture of the OPENNESS platform.
and supports social discussion, while supporting modern technological standards.
Moreover, such platform guarantees secure exchange of data between several services
of heterogeneous frameworks. The design of the platform has thus been strongly
characterized by the risk evaluation on the whole system, where the need to realize
a secure system was of paramount importance.
The logical architecture of the OPENNESS platform adopts a classical three
tier model, where every tier is independent from the others. The Three-Tier Archi-
tecture exposes a ﬁrst layer, or Web Layer, where a web server manages requests
coming from Clients, either Desktop, Web or Mobile, and delivers the content to
the Application Layer, which in turn interacts with the Data Layer. Such layer is in
charge to provide data to services in order to aggregate them and ﬁnally to satisfy
Clients requests.
The Web Layer, which is built on top of the Apache Server, is also composed by
a Web Cache, operating as a Reverse-Proxy, in order to reduce bandwidth and to
improve response time. The Apache Web server communicates with the Application
Layer components (e.g., Tomcat and PHP application servers), using AJP (Apache
JServ Protocol), which is an optimized protocol for the J2EE and PHP containers.
Communication between layers is based on the SSL (Secure Socket Layer) protocol.
The access to the platform is managed by an identity provider system, and a
speciﬁc module is in charge to manage user accounts, which are centralized on an
LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) server.
The other components of the platform are integrated with the LDAP repository
with a full synchronization of the user accounts; at the same time the modules for
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the users management within the individual components are disabled, in order to
make OPENNESS the only entry point for user registration and management.
Account centralization and OPENNESS speciﬁcations allowed the integration
of two of the most eﬃcient SSO Single-Sign On solutions. One of them is CAS
(Central Authentication Service) , an open source framework implementing a SSO
mechanism that provides a centralized authentication system on a single server.
When a request is sent to an application, it is redirected to CAS, which deals
with the authentication. The other Identity Provider implemented by OPENNESS,
Shibboleth, sets up his SSO (Single Sign-on) logic on SAML protocol (Security
Assertion Markup Language) allowing users to sign in to various systems using just
one identity. CAS can be integrated with the Shibboleth federated SSO platform
to serve as the authentication provider for Shibboleth.
As a multichannel platform OPENNESS will integrate mobile devices like smart-
phones and tablets either with iOS and Android. In order to allow a federated
authentication a SSO mechanism has been implemented through a CAS service
authentication using the REST protocol (Representational State Transfer) thus
guaranteeing the persistence of the authentication even among diﬀerent kinds of
applications using the platform.
The OPENNESS architecture is summarized in Figure 1. The module in the
left part of the ﬁgure shows the Web Layer, which includes the reverse-proxy. The
central part of the ﬁgure highlights the core of the platform, which is represented by
the Application Layer, which is in turn composed of diﬀerent submodules. Based
on the oﬀered functionalities, it is possible to identify diﬀerent submodules; in this
paper we will consider the following main blocks:
• SSO Container (or Authentication). Comprises the SSO modules, i.e., CAS and
Shibboleth, and is in charge of managing the authentication procedure.
• J2EE Container. Represents the web container in which all the services of the
platform relying on Java 2 Enterprise Edition are installed. Within this modules
it is possible to identify two main applications: the Liferay Portal and the D2R
WS 1 . Liferay is a web portal framework written in Java based on a Service-
Oriented Architecture (SOA). D2R WS is a framework that can be used to map
diﬀerent kinds of information to an ontology model, and retrieve them using
SPARQL queries. Such service can be used both to expose the information on a
certain database, and to perform SPARQL queries on external data providers.
• PHP Container. This block comprises all services that rely on PHP for their exe-
cution. In particular, we consider the Moodle and Mantis applications 2 . Moodle
is a modular e-Learning platform. It allows teachers to organize lectures, and
provides social features like forums, blogs, and chats to students. Mantis is a
popular open source bug tracking system written in PHP.
• SO Container. This container provides access to the most popular social network
platforms. This block is realized by means of the Virtuoso Universal Server 3 , a
1 Liferay: http://www.liferay.com/. D2R WS: http://www.d2qr.org/. Accessed: 2014-03-10.
2 Moodle: http://www.moodle.org/. Mantis: http://www.mantisbt.org/. Accessed: 2014-03-10.
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middleware which combines features of traditional relational databases with other
data models, providing uniform access to them. Within OPENNESS, Virtuoso is
used to manage the access to social media, through the Oauth2 protocol.
The right part of Figure 1 also depicts the Data Layer. Within such layer we
identify a set of databases used to store application data (e.g., Moodle DB, Liferay
DB) or user data (OpenLDAP), and the social media data provider.
3 Security, Scalability, Performance: Related Work
While precise deﬁnitions of security [2] and performance [8] properties exist in the
literature, to the best of our knowledge, no unique deﬁnition of “scalability” has
been established. With some variants, scalability is however usually intended as a
metric that links the size of the system with the performance that it is able to reach
[11,7]. Therefore, in our evaluation we will focus on performance metrics, and their
sensitivity with respect to the size of the system.
In the literature, the impact of security mechanism on performance metrics, and
thus on system scalability, is a well-known problem for diﬀerent application domains.
As an example, it is an important problem in the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
domain, where the scarcity of resources and the large number of nodes raise the
need to reduce the computational cost of security mechanisms and protocols. In
[22] the overhead introduced by three diﬀerent mechanism for secure communication
in WSNs is evaluated by experimental means. In the worst case, among the kind
of messages considered by authors, an overhead of up to 50% in message size has
been measured, with a subsequent increase of more than 10% in transmission time.
Similar results have also been obtained in completely diﬀerent application do-
mains, e.g. e-commerce [6,1]. In particular, the authors of [1] perform an exper-
imental evaluation of the impact of the TLS/SSL protocol on the performance of
an application server in a business-to-business (B2B) setup. The evaluation per-
formed by the authors of this work compares key performance indicators obtained
with and without a secure connection based on the SSL protocol, at varying the
number of clients that are concurrently using the system. Also in this case, the
results obtained by the authors show that using a SSL channel introduces a perfor-
mance degradation between 5% and 10%. In is interesting to note that, according
to authors themselves, such results are optimistic and that with diﬀerent workloads
an even greater impact should be expected.
The impact of security on performance is even higher on web services which
rely on XML for communication. Even though the use of XML for communication
guarantees properties like interoperability and ﬂexibility, its usage for implementing
security mechanisms has a great impact on performance, mainly due to its excessive
verbosity. Several works in the literature highlight the high performance cost due
to the adoption of WS-Security, a standard based on XML to provide security
mechanisms to web services. For example, results in [9] show an increase of network
3 Virtuoso: http://virtuoso.openlinksw.com/. Accessed: 2014-03-10.
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traﬃc up to 690% with the introduction of WS-Security if compared to web services
without any security mechanism. Even worse, results in [17] highlight an increase
of transmission time up to 2100% for response messages of small dimensions.
In addition to experimental approaches, model-based evaluation has also been
used as a method for relating performance and security aspects. The adoption of
a model-based approach allows analysts to i) obtain useful insights on the system
from the early phases of system design, and ii) perform “what-if” analyses in order
to estimate the impact deriving from architectural changes.
The authors of [21] analyze the tradeoﬀs existing in a key distribution centre,
using the Markovian process algebra PEPA. Other existing approaches in the com-
bined evaluation of performance and security are reviewed in [20]. In the same
paper, the authors describe a general process using the example of choosing an
appropriate key length for encryption.
For a successful deployment of a multi-service web-based system like OPEN-
NESS, means to evaluate its scalability with respect to the expected workload are
needed. Moreover, the evident impact of security mechanisms on the planned ar-
chitecture needs to be assessed as well, in order to ﬁnd the proper balance between
security, performance, and ﬂexibility of the system. In this paper we describe a
model-based approach for performance and scalability analysis of OPENNESS.
4 Stochastic Model of the OPENNESS Platform
4.1 Modeling Approach
The modeling approach adopted in this paper is based on a compositional approach,
where the overall system model is built by composing together a set of submodels,
each addressing a speciﬁc aspect or component of the system.
In performing such decomposition, particular attention is devoted to the iden-
tiﬁcation of the interfaces between the diﬀerent submodels. Clearly deﬁning the
interfaces between submodels before their implementation improves the reusability,
maintainability and modularity of the obtained submodels. Taking this concept
to its highest level leads to a modeling paradigm that recalls object-oriented pro-
gramming: the implementation of each submodel is independent from the other
interacting submodels, and it only depends on the deﬁned interfaces. Submod-
els obtained in this way are modular i.e., they can be easily replaced or reﬁned
as needed, provided that the input and output interfaces remain the same. This
approach also eases the integration with external tools: a given submodel, imple-
menting a speciﬁc function, may be replaced with an ad-hoc external tool, either
directly or through a wrapper model. An example of such integration is described in
[4], where adopting this approach allowed SAN submodel implementing a mobility
model to be replaced with the output produced by a vehicular mobility simulator.
Another dual aspect that enhances the modularity of submodels is the identiﬁca-
tion of their parameters. In complex systems like OPENNESS, diﬀerent components
may have a similar behavior, only diﬀering by some numerical parameters that are
speciﬁc of a particular instance of the component, depending on its role in the
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Fig. 2. Template models and parameterization.
system, or on the environment in which it is operating.
This process leads to the deﬁnition of “template submodels”, which are com-
posed of two parts: a part deﬁning its behavior and a part deﬁning its parameters
(Figure 2). In the construction of the overall model these templates are then in-
stantiated multiple times, with diﬀerent parameters settings. This approach saves
the modeler from manually creating (and maintaining) multiple models for compo-
nents having a similar behavior, which is a very time-consuming and error-prone
task. Also, any change in a template model is automatically propagated to all the
instances of that template.
Instances of templates are then composed according to precisely deﬁned rules, in
order to obtain the overall model for the desired scenario. The ability to easily create
diﬀerent instances of the same model makes it also easier to evaluate the system
under diﬀerent conditions and diﬀerent scenarios, which requires only adding or
removing model instances or changing their parameters. When coupled with model-
transformation techniques, such approach can greatly reduce the eﬀort needed to
create and assemble large stochastic models [12].
In this paper, the model is deﬁned using Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs)
[16], which provide useful features for the concrete application of such approach.
4.2 Assumptions and Metrics
The system architecture used as a reference for constructing the analysis model is
the one described in Section 2. In order to precisely deﬁne some aspects of the
system, some assumptions have been introduced on the behavior of users and on
the deployment of services provided by the system.
The OPENNESS platform is used by users having diﬀerent proﬁles, e.g.,
“teacher”, “developer”, “project manager”. Each user of the system may perform a
number of high-level actions on the platform, e.g., “manage an e-Learning course”,
“engage the communication and collaboration services”. The kind of actions that
are available to each user, and the pattern followed for their execution depend on
the user proﬁle.
Each action requires the use of one or more services of the platform (e.g., Moo-
dle, Virtuoso, etc.). We also assume that the behavior of a generic user of the
OPENNESS platform can be outlined as follows:
• The user u remains inactive for a mean time T uactivation, according to an exponen-
tial distribution with rate λuactivation = 1/T
u
activation.
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• After becoming active, a user executes, in a probabilistic way, a number of actions
among those available to him, before returning into an inactive state.
• After the execution of an action has been completed, the beginning of the sub-
sequent one is delayed by a physiological reaction time of the user (think time)
T uthink, in which the user processes the output of the platform and decides whether
he will perform further actions or return into an inactive state. Such delay is dis-
tributed following an exponential distribution with rate λudelay = 1/T
u
think.
The assumptions concerning the services provided by the platform are instead
the following:
• Requests received by service s are served with an exponential rate λsserve =
1/T sserve.
• With a certain probability psproxy, requests for service s can be handled directly
by the proxy.
• When a service request is served by the proxy, the service time is reduced by
a factor γsproxy, i.e., the average service time in this case is γ
s
proxy · T sserve, with
γsproxy < 1.
The metrics of interest that will be evaluated by the analysis are mainly performance
indicators, and are described in the following.
Us: Utilization of service s. This metric provides an indication on the dimensioning
of resources allocated to each service. It is evaluated as the probability that, at
a certain instant of time, there are requests of service s waiting to be served.
Ts: Mean waiting time for service s. This metric provides an indication of quality
of service received by system users. The metric is evaluated as the mean time
that elapses from the instant to which a service request for s is issued, to the
instant in which the request is served.
The scalability of the OPENNESS platform is highlighted through the evaluation
of such metrics at varying parameters related to the size of the system, e.g., the
number of users and the frequency with which they request services provided by the
platform. The impact of security mechanisms on system performance, and thus on
its scalability, can be evaluated by assuming an increase of service delays, based on
experimental analyses available in literature (e.g., see Section 3).
4.3 System Model
The compositional modeling approach, the predeﬁned assumptions, and the mea-
sures of interest to be evaluated, led us to identify three template models, each
addressing a speciﬁc aspect or component of the system. The overall OPENNESS
model is built by composing together such submodels. For the sake of brevity, in
the following we provide a detailed description of two of the three template models,
UserBehavior and Service; while the third one, Action, is only brieﬂy described. Af-
ter that, a description of the composed model and a speciﬁcation of the previously
deﬁned metrics of interest are provided.
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Fig. 3. UserBehavior template SAN model, representing a generic OPNENNESS user.
4.3.1 UserBehavior Template Model
According to the introduced assumptions, a user of the OPENNESS platform pe-
riodically becomes active, performs a number of actions, and then returns in an
inactive state. The selection of an action by the user is modeled as a probabilistic
choice. The actions that are available to the user, as well as the probability of being
selected, depend on the user proﬁle.
The SAN model for a generic user behavior u of the OPENNESS platform is
depicted in Figure 3; in this one and in the following ﬁgures, interfaces to other
template models are highlighted with a dashed yellow box. The user is initially
in a waiting state, modeled as a token in place Idle. The SAN activity Auth
represents the beginning of a new user session, and the subsequent request to the
authentication module, i.e., the event for which a user becomes active. The ﬁring
time of such activity is exponentially distributed with rate 1/Tactivation.
When the Auth transition ﬁres a token is added in place ReqAuth and in place
WaitAuth. Place ReqAuth is an interface to the model of the authentication service
(see Section 4.3.2), and it holds the total number of requests that are currently
waiting to be served. Conversely, place WaitAuth is local to the user model, and is
used to keep track that the user is waiting for the authentication to be performed.
Similarly, place DoneAuth is shared with the model of the authentication service,
and contains a token when a new request has been fulﬁlled. When there is a token
both in DoneAuth and WaithAuth places, the activity AuthOK is enabled and ﬁres,
representing the completion of the authentication procedure. In this case, a token
is added in place SelectAction.
The ChoiceAction activity is then enabled and ﬁres, representing a probabilis-
tic choice between the actions available to the user. The activity has a case for
each action X available to the user proﬁle modeled, and each case has a diﬀerent
probability of being selected, pX. When the case X is probabilistically selected, a
token is added in place ReqX and in place WaitX, which represents the beginning
of the corresponding action performed by the user. Similarly as to what already
described for the authentication service, each place ReqX is shared with the corre-
sponding model of the user action (Section 4.3.3), while place WaitX is local to the
user model. Once the action is completed, a token is added in place DoneX by the
corresponding Action model, thus enabling the corresponding EndX activity. When
the activity EndX ﬁres a token is added in place ActionCompleted, representing the
completion of the action performed by the user.
The reaction time of the user is modeled by the ThinkTime activity, which ﬁres
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Fig. 4. Service template SAN model, representing a generic service of the OPENNESS platform.
with an exponentially distributed delay Tthink. The ThinkTime activity has two
cases, one corresponding to the choice to end the user session and return to an
inactive state (selected with probability pEnd), and the other corresponding to the
choice to perform a further action (selected with probability 1− pEnd).
4.3.2 Service Template Model
The SAN template model for a generic service s of the platform is depicted in
Figure 4. Place Queue is an interface to the corresponding ReqY of each Action
model. Thus, at any time this place contains a token for each pending service
request. The DoReq activity models the beginning of the processing of a user request;
with probability psproxy the service request will be handled by the proxy (case 1),
while with probability 1− pproxy the service is provided by the machine hosting the
service itself (case 2). In the ﬁrst case a token is added in place WaitProxy, while
in the second case a token is added in place NotProxed.
Activity Serve represents the fulﬁllment of a service request; its ﬁring time is
exponentially distributed with rate λsserve. When the activity ﬁres, it removes a
token from place NotProxed and adds a token in place Served.
Place UsingProxy is shared between all the instances of the Service template
model, and it contains a token when the proxy is being used to satisfy a service re-
quest. When there is a token in place WaitProxy and the proxy resource is free (i.e.,
the place UsingProxy is empty), the activity UseProxy is enabled and ﬁres, adding
a token in places Proxying and UsingProxy, thus representing the utilization of the
proxy. Activity ServeProxed represents the fulﬁllment of the service request by the
proxy; its ﬁring delay is thus distributed according an exponential distribution with
rate γsproxy · λsserve. Similarly to the Serve activity, when the activity ServeProxed
ﬁres it removes a token from places Proxying and UsingProxy, and adds a token
in place Served, to represent the fulﬁllment of the service request.
4.3.3 Action Template Model
The execution of a user action generates a number of service requests to the plat-
form. Once the action has started, the involvement of the diﬀerent services is
modeled as a probabilistic choice, in a similar way as in the UserBehavior tem-
plate model. The platform services that are needed for the diﬀerent actions depend
on the kind of action itself. For example, the action “manage an e-Learning course”
will perform a number of requests to the “PHP Container” and “Database” services.
The SAN template model for a generic action is depicted in Figure 5. Due to its
similarity to the UserBehavior template model, and to reasonable limits of space,
we do not provide a description of such model, whose details can be found in [19].
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Fig. 5. Action template SAN model, representing a generic user action.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Composed model of the overall OPENNESS platform. In a ﬁrst stage the UserBehavior model
is composed with instances of the Action model (a). In a second stage the diﬀerent instances of the
UserBehavior-Action composed model are replicated and then composed with instances of the Service
template model (b).
4.3.4 Composing the Overall System Model
In order to obtain the overall model of the OPENNESS platform, the template SAN
models described in Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3 are instantiated several times
with the appropriate parameters, and connected together – through the identiﬁed
interfaces – using the Replicate/Join composition formalism [15].
In a ﬁrst composition step models for the diﬀerent user proﬁles are created; each
of them is obtained by composing an instance of the UserBehavior template (Sec-
tion 4.3.1) with a number of instances of the Action template (Section 4.3.3), based
on the actions that are available to the corresponding user proﬁle. In performing
the composition, for each action X, interfaces ReqX and EndX of the UserBehavior
model are connected with places ActStart and ActEnd of the Action model. This
step is then repeated for each user proﬁle that should be modeled. The number of
ActX submodels depend on the number of actions that are available for the involved
user proﬁle. An example model corresponding to a user proﬁle for which 8 actions
are available is shown in Figure 6a. This kind of composed model will be referred
to as the UserProfile composed model in the following.
The complete system model is then created in a second composition step, by
replicating the models of user proﬁles, and composing them with instances of the
Service template model. Multiple instances of the UserProfile composed SAN
model are added, one for each of the user proﬁles that are supported by the system.
Each instance of the UserProfile model is replicated through the Replica operator
[15], in order to represent a number of identical users which operate on the platform
according to the same proﬁle. In the model of Figure 6b, each submodel “UserK” is
an instance of the UserProfile template similar to the one depicted in Figure 6a,
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while the red rectangle “Rep” represents the Replica composition operator.
Through the Join node “Join1” all the replicated models are composed together.
In the composition, all the interface places ReqX and EndX corresponding to the
same platform service are shared together. Then, such places are shared with the
corresponding Queue and Served places of the diﬀerent instances of the Service
template model, which are shown in the upper right part of the ﬁgure. The instances
of the Service template also share the UsingProxy place, as already described in
Section 4.3.2. Finally, the Startup submodel is an helper model that is used to
properly initialize the parameters of the diﬀerent template instances.
The number of submodels of kind UserProfile and the number of instances
of the Service template depend, respectively, from the number of diﬀerent user
proﬁles and the number of diﬀerent services that should be modeled.
4.3.5 Speciﬁcation of Metrics
The metrics of interest deﬁned in Section 4.2 are speciﬁed on the stochastic model
using reward structures. More in details:
Us: Utilization of service s. To evaluate this metric, the reward function is deﬁned
as a function returning one unit of reward for each state in which service s is busy
(i.e., Mark(Queue)>0), and zero otherwise. The mean reward that is obtained in
a given instant of time t corresponds to the desired metric.





T stot is the total amount of time that users spend waiting for service s, and N
s
req
is the number of requests that have been issued for service s. In reward terms,
the quantity T stot can be obtained by deﬁning a reward function that assigns to
each state of the model the total number of users that are currently waiting for
the service (i.e., Mark(Queue)); while N sreq is obtained by deﬁning a function that
provides one unit of reward each time that service s is requested (i.e., each time
that the case corresponding to service s is selected after the ﬁring of a ReqService
activity in an Action model).
In this paper, both the metrics are evaluated at steady-state. It should be noted
that, using the same model, diﬀerent metrics can be evaluated as well.
5 Evaluation and Results
In this section the model described in Section 4 is evaluated in diﬀerent conﬁgu-
rations, to consider the impact of some key parameters on the metrics of interest.
Section 5.1 deﬁnes the scenario that will be used as a reference for the following
evaluations, and introduces the default parameters assigned to the model. The
scalability of the OPENNESS platform is analyzed in Section 5.2, while the impact
of introducing some security countermeasures is evaluated in Section 5.3. All the
obtained values have been computed by discrete-event simulation, with a conﬁdence
level of at least 99%, and a conﬁdence half-interval of 1%.
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ID Proﬁle Name Tactivation (sec.) Tthink (sec.) Users
1 Project Manager 1800
20
10
2 Developer 3600 50
3 Trainee 600 80
4 Teacher 3600 10
5 Public Citizen 600 100
6 Decision Maker 3600 20
Table 1
User proﬁles that have been considered in the reference scenario, and their default parameters.
1: Manage working groups 5: Manage an e-Learning course
2: Assign bugs and development activities 6: Generate an entrepreneurship idea
3: Manage bugs and development activities 7: Engage the communication and collaboration services
4: Access to an e-Learning course 8: Decide for the realization of an entrepreneurship idea
Table 2
Actions that are available to OPENNESS users in the considered scenario.
5.1 Reference Scenario and Default Parameters
The reference scenario considers 6 diﬀerent user proﬁles, 8 kinds of actions, and
6 services. The user proﬁles and the corresponding parameters are reported in
Table 1. Each of them has a diﬀerent activation time (Tactivation), but the same
think delay (Tthink), set to 20 seconds. The total number of users for each proﬁle is
also reported in the table.
The actions that can be performed in the platform are listed in Table 2. The
association between them and the diﬀerent user proﬁles is detailed in Table 3,
where for each user proﬁle are given the available actions and the corresponding
selection probability pX (see Section 4.3.1). Table 3 also lists the value of the puend
parameter, i.e., the probability that user become inactive after having completed a
speciﬁc action.
A user with proﬁle Project Manager may manage the working groups (Action
1) and assign bugs and development activities to developers (Action 2). The latter
of the two actions is much more frequent, since development activities will change
more often than working groups. A Developer may only manage bugs and develop-
ment activities (Action 3); moreover, he will typically perform a longer sequence of
actions in the same user session. This aspect is modeled with a lower probability
to terminate the session, i.e., the value of the pend parameter is lower.
Similarly, a Trainee may only access to e-Learning courses (Action 4). A user
with proﬁle Teacher may access to courses, but he may also manage them (Action
5). A Public Citizen may be involved in the generation of an entrepreneurship idea
(Action 6), and may use the platform to engage the communication and collabora-
tion services (Action 7). Finally, users with proﬁle Decision Maker use the platform
to decide about the realization of ideas proposed by citizens (Action 8).
As previously described, each action involves the utilization of one or more ser-
vices of the OPENNESS platform. The services considered in the reference scenario
are listed in Table 4. In addition to the Authentication service, to which a request
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User Proﬁle Action Selection Probability
ID Name p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 pEnd
1 Project Manager 0.2 0.8 – – – – – – 0.5
2 Developer – – 1.0 – – – – – 0.2
3 Trainee – – – 1.0 – – – – 0.2
4 Teacher – – – 0.6 0.4 – – – 0.2
5 Public Citizen – – – – – 0.8 0.2 – 0.4
6 Decision Maker – – – – – – – 1.0 0.5
Table 3
Available actions for each user proﬁle of the reference scenario, and corresponding selection probabilities.
ID Service Name Layer Tserve (sec.) pproxy γproxy
1 Authentication Web 0.5 0.05 0.5
2 PHP Container Application 0.1 0.4 0.4
3 J2EE Container Application 0.5 0.3 0.7
4 SO Container Application 1.0 0.2 0.7
5 Database Data 0.1 0.1 0.9
6 Social Media Data 2.0 0.5 0.7
Table 4
Services that are considered in the reference scenario, and their default parameters.
is issued initiating a new session, other ﬁve services are provided by the architec-
ture, corresponding to the main blocks of the architecture described in Section 2.
For each of these services the table lists the mean time to satisfy a user request of
such services (Tserve), the probability that a service request is satisﬁed by the proxy
(pproxy), and the corresponding reduction factor for the time required to satisfy a
service request (γproxy).
The mapping between actions and services is described in Table 5, which lists
the services involved in each action, and their probability of being selected. Actions
1–5 involve the usage of the PHP Container (Service 2) and Database (Service 5)
services only, since they are all based on PHP applications. More in details, actions
1–3 involve the usage of the “Mantis” application, while actions 4–5 involve the
usage of the “Moodle” application. The ratio between the selection probability
of the two services (i.e., the PHP Container and the Database) depends on the
kind of action. For example, managing bugs and development activities (Action
3) is assumed to have a heavier impact on the database with respect to managing
working groups (Action 1).
The “generation of an entrepreneurship idea” (Action 6) involves collecting and
processing diﬀerent information sources, in order to correctly describe the idea
with consistent information. Accordingly, such action uses multiple services of the
OPENNESS platform: the J2EE Container, the SO Container, the Database, as
well as the Social Media infrastructure. The J2EE container is used for accessing
the Liferay platform and the D2R server. The latter allows the user to access,
through the database, to the main concepts that will be referenced by the idea; the
SO container provides the access to Virtuoso, which in turn supports the collection
of information from social media.
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Action Service Selection Probability
ID Name p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 pEnd
1 Manage working groups * 0.7 – – 0.3 – 0.5
2 Assign bugs and development activities * 0.6 – – 0.4 – 0.2
3 Manage bugs and development activities * 0.4 – – 0.6 – 0.2
4 Access to an e-Learning course * 0.7 – – 0.3 – 0.2
5 Manage an e-Learning course * 0.5 – – 0.5 – 0.5
6 Generate an idea * – 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3
7 Engage the communication and collaboration services * – 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6
8 Decide for the realization of an idea * – 0.6 0.2 0.2 – 0.7
* The “Authentication” service (Service 1) is not requested by users within as speciﬁc action;
instead, it is requested only once at the beginning of each user session.
Table 5
Services that are involved in the execution of each action, and their probability of being selected.
The same set of services is exercised also when using the communication and
collaboration services (Action 7). In this case however, due to the “social” nature
of such an action, the selection probability of the Social Media service is higher,
while the usage probability of the J2EE and SO containers is reduced. Finally,
deciding for the realization of an idea (Action 8), requires the same services as for
the generation of the idea, with the exception of the social media plugin, which is
not used in the decision process.
It should be noted that the introduced scenario allows to evaluate the system
at varying some key parameters. The modeling and evaluation approach is inde-
pendent of the actual values of system parameters (including available user proﬁles,
actions, and services), and can be used to evaluate the performance behavior of the
OPENNESS platform in a wide range of conﬁgurations and scenarios.
5.2 System Scalability
One of the most critical parameters in evaluating the scalability of a multi-service
platform is the number of users that have access to the system. Figure 7a depicts
the utilization percentage (Us on the y-axis) of the diﬀerent services provided by the
platform at varying the total number of users accessing the system. In particular,
the system has been evaluated with a total number of users multiple with respect
to the reference conﬁguration. The lower x-axis in the ﬁgure is labeled with the
adopted multiplier (e.g., 2n, 3n), while the upper x-axis is labeled with the total
number of users in the system. The reference conﬁguration is highlighted with a
vertical line in the ﬁgure.
As shown in the ﬁgure, the system reaches its maximum workload, due to a
utilization factor of the proxy approaching 100%, when serving a population of
around 1000 users. In such conditions, the services SO Container and Social Media
reach a utilization factor near to 90% as well. Above a certain threshold (about
800 users) the utilization of some services appears to decrease. Such behavior is
caused by the overload condition of the system. In fact, active users perform actions
sequentially; the overload of some services (e.g., SO Container) causes some actions
to experience a high execution time, with the consequence of having less actions to
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be initiated by users per unit of time.
Although the previous ﬁgure provides a good indication of system scalability
with respect to the number of users, such results assume that the ratio between
the diﬀerent user proﬁles remain constant during the growth of the user-base. In
general, this is however not the case. Actually, some kinds of users are subject to a
higher increasing rate with respect to the others. In particular, the number of users
with Public Citizen proﬁle can experience a very rapid growth, depending on the
popularity and spread of the platform.
Figure 7b depicts the utilization percentage of the diﬀerent services (on the
y-axis), at varying the number of users with proﬁle Public Citizen (on the lower x-
axis). Also in this case, the upper x-axis is marked with the total number of users in
the system. When comparing this picture with the previous one it becomes evident
that the ratio between the diﬀerent user proﬁles has a great impact on the scalability
of the system. In this case the saturation of the system resources is reached with
just 600 users, i.e., 40% less then obtained when assuming a proportional increase
of users with all the diﬀerent proﬁles. Also in this case the bottleneck appears to
be the proxy, followed by the SO Container and Social Media services, which reach
a utilization factor of about 90%.
By analyzing the quality of service perceived by users of the OPENNESS plat-
form, in terms of the mean time to have a service request fulﬁlled, Ts, we observe
that the practical limit to system scalability is way lower than 600 users (Figure 8a).
How it is shown in the ﬁgure, even with a total number of users higher than 400,
users experience a great increase of the mean waiting time for four of the six services.
With a population of more than 500 users, average waiting times of 10 seconds and
higher are experienced, which are clearly unacceptable from a user’s point of view.
Such a great increase is probably due to the saturation of the proxy, which has been
shown to be the performance bottleneck in the considered scenario.
Evaluations reported in Figure 8b show the eﬀect of an increase of proxy per-
formances. In particular, we assume to double the proxy processing power, thus
halving its processing delay. Such an increase in proxy performances is modeled by
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Fig. 7. Impact on services utilization of an increasing number of users interacting with the platform.
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Fig. 8. Impact on quality of service perceived by users of the OPENNESS platform of the total number of
users with proﬁle Public Citizen.
and Figure 8b in the reference conﬁguration (vertical line in both the ﬁgures), the
resulting system-level improvement is minimum: the greater impact is on the Social
Media service, for which we however have a reduction of the mean waiting time
of about 25%. For the Authentication and Database services the improvement is
practically negligible.
Still, such modiﬁcation has a great impact on the system scalability with respect
to the Public Citizen user proﬁle (see Figure 8b). The practical limit to the number
of users in the system is greatly improved in this case. Actually, it is possible to
obtain acceptable waiting times for all the services until about 500 total users. With
an improved proxy, the bottlenecks are now the SO Container and Social Media
services, which provide unacceptable mean waiting times for a population of users
greater than 500 (330 of which having Public Citizen proﬁle). This is partially due
to the higher service time with respect to the other services (see Table 4), but also
to the fact that they are heavily used exactly by the Public Citizen proﬁle.
5.3 Impact of Security Mechanisms
In this section the OPENNESS platform is evaluated considering the eﬀect of in-
troducing some security mechanisms. We assume that the introduction of such
mechanisms produces an adverse eﬀect on system performance, as largely docu-
mented by experimental work in the literature (see Section 3). The obtained results
are then compared with the ones described in the previous section.
Based on a threat analysis previously carried out on the reference system, a
number of countermeasures were identiﬁed to contrast the detected threats; we
refer to them through the identiﬁer Cn. Among the 13 countermeasures that were
identiﬁed [19], we focus on two of them that could have a signiﬁcant impact on
system performance:
C007 “Validate inputs provided by users with blacklist or whitelist approaches”.
C008 “Implement an Intrusion Prevention System”.
The introduction of validation mechanisms for data provided by users (C007)
requires additional checks in the application, with a subsequent increase, although
L. Montecchi et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 310 (2015) 113–133 129
Service ID
Countermeasure ID 1 2 3 4 5 6
C007 – 5% 5% 5% – –
C008 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Table 6
Increase in mean service times due to the introduction of security mechanisms C007 and C008.
limited, of the time required to satisfy a service request. Such countermeasure does
not impact on the whole OPENNESS platform, but only on components that run
application code, i.e., the PHP Container, J2EE Container, and SO Container.
Concerning the introduction of intrusion prevention mechanisms (C008) we assume
that they are introduced in several points of the architecture, thus having an impact
on all the service provided by the platform. In numerical terms, we assume an
increase of mean service times of 5% with the introduction of C007, and 10% with
the introduction of C008 (Table 6).
The following evaluation focuses on highlighting the diﬀerences between four
diﬀerent system conﬁgurations:
(i) Default conﬁguration;
(ii) Implementation of C007;
(iii) Implementation of C008;
(iv) Implementation of C007 and C008.
For both simplicity and space constraints, we focus on a subset of the available
services: the Authentication and the SO Container. This choice is due to the
following considerations on results obtained in Section 5.2: i) excluding the proxy,
the SO Container service resulted the less scalable service, together with the Social
Media service; ii) the Authentication service, together with the Database, resulted
instead the one less suﬀering from scalability problems. Focusing on these two
services provides then a good understanding, for the purpose of this paper, of the
behavior of the overall platform. In this case we consider an increase in users with
the Public Citizen proﬁle only, as this conﬁguration was deemed to be more critical
with respect to system scalability.
Concerning the utilization of the Authentication service (Figure 9a), the impact
of security countermeasures results to be minimum. Even for a large number of
users, the utilization of the service does not go beyond 30%, without a noticeable
increase with respect to the default conﬁguration.
The introduced security mechanisms have instead a considerable impact on the
utilization of the SO Container service (Figure 9b). In this case, even the intro-
duction of the sole C007 mechanism produces a noticeable increase of the load on
the service. In particular, for a conﬁguration with 300 users with proﬁle Public
Citizen (470 users in total), the increase in service time is around 10% just with the
introduction of C007 or C008, and around 20% if introducing both. In particular,
the greatest increase occurs with a mid-large number of users (between 400 and 500
users in total), while the increase is slightly lower with a larger user population. We
also note that the countermeasure C007 is the one causing the greater part of the
load increase, causing an increase higher than 10%, while C008 is nearly irrelevant.
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Fig. 10. Impact of security mechanisms C007 and C008 on the mean waiting time.
The impact of the introduction of the two security countermeasures is greatly
noticeable in the mean waiting times of users. As shown in Figure 10a, if consid-
ering the mean waiting times experienced by users, the two countermeasures have
a considerable impact even on the Authentication service. It should be noted that
such drawback was not noticeable if analyzing just infrastructure-oriented metrics
like in Figure 9a. However, the increase in the waiting time seems to be constant,
i.e., it does not get worse with an even higher number of users, and it is always
around 10%. This is probably due to the limited utilization of the service, which
prevent the stacking of excessive delays in the fulﬁllment of user requests.
Finally, Figure 10b depicts the impact of the considered security mechanisms on
the mean waiting time for the SO Container service. The impact of both mech-
anisms is in this case huge, especially when the number of users in the system
increase. With a number of users barely double with respect to the default conﬁgu-
ration (200 Public Citizen users, 370 in total) introducing both the countermeasures
increases the mean waiting time of about 30%.
If the number of users continues to increase the deterioration is sharp: with 300
Public Citizen users (470 in total) the introduction of both the countermeasures
produces a mean waiting time which is nearly double with respect to the one ob-
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tained in the default conﬁguration. Moreover, even the introduction of only one
of the two mechanisms increases the waiting time for the SO Container service of
nearly 30%. This behavior is mainly due to two factors: i) the high mean serving
time of the SO Container service, but also ii) the high utilization of this service by
users with Public Citizen proﬁle. Finally, it is interesting to note that in this case –
despite their diﬀerent impact on service times (see Table 6) – the two countermea-
sures have a similar impact on the overall system performance ﬁgures, with a slight
higher impact due to C007.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we applied stochastic modeling to the evaluation of performance and
scalability metrics of the multi-service web-based OPENNESS platform. The ap-
proach presented in this paper highlights one emerging application of stochastic
modeling, i.e., the evaluation of the impact of security countermeasures on the per-
formance of a service-based architecture. The framework deﬁned in this paper also
highlights how achieving modularity can improve the reusability and maintainability
of models based on Stochastic Petri Nets.
In the last ten years, security and model-based evaluation have been more and
more coupled together [13], and formalism for quantitative analysis of security prop-
erties have started to emerge (e.g., the ADVISE formalism [10,14]). In this paper
we addressed a complementary aspect in “quantifying” security, i.e., quantifying
its impact on system performance. While quantifying security and quantifying its
performance impact are usually addressed in isolation, strong relationship exist be-
tween these two aspects. As a ﬁrst step towards a uniﬁed performance/security
evaluation approach, future work aims at extending the framework presented in
this paper with attack models, and apply quantitative security analysis in order
to be able to identify the most convenient architectural solutions, quantitatively
balancing security, performance, and costs requirements.
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